Training program for reserve officers

 
 

Training program for reserve officers




The Department for reserve officers of the National Defence University of Ukraine is recruiting students for training program for reserve officers to 7 military occupational specialties: " Logistic support for the troops ," " Mathematical and the maintenance of the automated systems ," " Social Psychology ", " Political Science" ; "Finance and Economics," " Construction and operation of military and special structures ," "Application of engineering and engineering - engineering units." Reception of documents of candidates for the training starts from 1 February to 15 June 2014 . Competitive selection of candidates will be held from May 1 to July 30, 2014 Tuition - 15,000 USD. Referral for medical students receive a commission after the submission of the said documents. We ask candidates for training to focus on samples of paperwork . Copies of the documents presented in neat and in the file. You should have the original documents . 4 . To apply for the training of students face competition , which consists of: - Psychological selection; -Check the level of pre-conscription training; -Check level of fitness. 5 . The competitive selection will be made by the Selection Committee at the National University of Defense of Ukraine from April 15 to July 31, 2014 . Address the selection committee : National University of Defence CPR number 4 of the University of Kiev , 049 , str. Antonov aircraft , 2/ 32. Bodies . 271-09-72 , office. 2a Schedule of documents : Monday to Friday from 10.00 to 16.30

 

Soviet Military Education:
Technical, Tactical, Traditional

Colonel Richard G. Head, USAF

IN THE Soviet Union war is a science. As a science, its meaning, method, and conduct can be analyzed, taught, and learned. But until recently analysts in the United States knew little about the Soviet philosophy of military education, its purposes, institutions, courses of instruction, and methods of teaching military science. In one of the rare instances of Soviet-U.S. military cooperation, a group of U.S. officers had the opportunity to visit several Soviet institutions of higher military education in the spring of 1977. The purpose of this article is to report on that trip and integrate what we learned into the broader framework of comparative military education.

The Soviet Ministry of Defense extended an official invitation to the United States to send a delegation of senior military students from the National Defense University in early 1977. Two previous groups of National War College students had visited Russia in 1960 and 1964, but the last official military exchange had been in 1957. During the spring of 1977, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to deteriorate in the wake of the U.S. proposal for deep cuts in strategic arms and Soviet sensitivities over President Carter's human rights statements. In this atmosphere we wondered what the motives of the Russians could be in inviting us. We did not find out until the last day of the trip.

The U.S. delegation consisted of nine officers, led by Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard (USA), President of the National Defense University; Lieutenant Commander Steve Kime (USN), faculty member; six National War College students, and one student from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The delegation departed Washington on 9 May 1977 and spent one week in the Soviet Union, visiting the Malinovskiy Armored Forces Academy in Moscow, the Grechko Naval Academy, and the Frunze Naval School in Leningrad, and touring the historic battleground of Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad). We requested a visit to the General Staff Academy, but it was refused for "lack of time to prepare."

During the final ceremonies, Colonel General Makarov, 1 head of the Department of Military Education, Ministry of Defense, told us the motivation for the visit. Soviet military officers believe that most, if not all, U.S. writing about East-West issues is biased and inaccurate. Soviet historical experiences are neglected, and their motives are misunderstood. He made it apparent that the Soviet Union wanted to begin a series of military-to-military exchanges, free from contentious discussions of foreign policy, SALT, force levels, and human rights. 2 He stressed historical ties between the two countries, the Soviet desire for peace, and the necessity for cooperation to constrain arms competition. Our own conclusions were somewhat different, but we readily agreed that the two countries approach the issue of defense with unique frames of reference. Part of the contrast can be traced to differences in officer education, which became evident on our visit to three of their military schools.

Soviet military education institutions comprise a vast network within the U.S.S.R., but they do not have to begin from scratch to develop military officers. The Russian educational system is highly authoritarian, structured, and militarized. 3 By the time a young man applies to an officer commissioning school, he will already have completed ten years of general education with strong emphasis on basic science, technology, and mathematics. He will have participated in a whole series of military-patriotic programs, including tactical military games as a regular part of the ten-year school. 4 In addition, he will probably have been a member of the Komsomol (Young Communists) and DOSAAF (All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy). 5

Soviet Military Officer Schools

Soviet military officer institutions are of three types. 6 First, middle schools train undergraduates, have a two-year curriculum, and are comparable to Western secondary technical schools. (See Tables I and II.) Second, higher schools are also undergraduate institutions, but they generally have a four-year program, and many are extending to five years. They offer a higher education degree, similar to the U.S. bachelor of science. Third, the academies or military universities conduct professional military education (PME) and are similar to U.S. intermediate and senior service schools. (See Table III.) They offer graduate studies, some research opportunities, and the highest academic degrees ("candidate of sciences" and "doctor of sciences"). Finally, although it is nominally an "academy," the General Staff Academy is, in fact, on a higher level, similar to the National War College in prestige and promotion potential.

  Middle
Schools
Higher
Schools
Strategic Rocket Forces - 7
Ground Forces    

combined arms tanks
artillery and rockets
artillery engineers
troop air defense
airbornea

1
-
1
-
-
9
9
12
3
5
Troops of National Air Defense    

surface-to-air missiles
flying training
radio-technical

-
-
5
6
3
-
Air Forces    

flying training
aviation-engineering
and technical

-
2
13
10
Navyb   1   10  
Total 10 87

 

Sources: William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," p. 38; and William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts within the Soviet Forces," in The Future of Soviet Military Power, p. 87.

a Airborne troops are actually a semiautonomous arm.
b Little is known about the navy schools. At one time naval pilots were trained at the Yeysk Higher Military Aviation School.

Table I. Soviet middle and higher military schools.

Table II. Military and higher military schools not specifically associated with any one service

 

Number of Schools

Ministry of Defense  

political officers
rear services or logistics
signal
military engineers
motor transport
chemical defense
military-technical
civil defense
road and engineer
building and construction
finance

9
6
12
3
4
3
2
1
1
4
1

Not run by Ministry of Defense  

KGB (border guards)
MVD (internal security)

Total

3
 5
_______
54

 

Source: William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts within the Soviet Forces," in The Future of Soviet Military Power, p. 88.

Frunze Naval School

The Frunze Naval School was established in Leningrad (then St. Petersburg) in 1701 and has about 1000 students. It is one of the higher military schools, accepting cadets from ages 17 to 22 years (normally 17-18). Entrance examinations are required, and the dates and testing locations are widely publicized around the country. (One of the publicity/information documents was entitled, For Those Who Wish to Study in Military Schools and Academies.) 7

The five-year curriculum consists of a wide range of subjects, including 150 hours of naval history (much of it czarist), naval tactics, navigation, ocean science, fire control, ship handling, and political economy. Twenty-five percent of the curriculum is devote to political indoctrination, ideology (Marxism-Leninism), and cultural trips to museums and monuments. Much of the training is done at sea during summer cruises, and one entire year is spent with operational forces. No cadet training is done on nuclear submarines, and training in amphibious warfare is extremely limited. (Soviet naval infantry officers are trained and provided by the Soviet army.) Some study is made of Allied military operations during the Normandy invasion, but Pacific amphibious operations are generally considered irrelevant to Soviet strategy.

Perhaps because the use of the Soviet navy in World War II was generally limited to its utility as a seaward extension of the land front, the current curriculum at the Frunze seemed to emphasize the Imperial Czarist use of the navy and its global projection of Russian influence. This would appear to be consistent with Admiral Gorshkov's writings in the last few years. 8

While a cadet's education at the Frunze (and other undergraduate schools) is broader than at many Soviet schools, it is considerably more specialized than m the United States. This is due to the "engineering philosophy" that prevails in Soviet education and the requirement to train cadets specifically for service in their school's branch. Frunze graduates do not go into nuclear submarines, naval aviation, or naval infantry. The mission of the school is to graduate loyal surface fleet officers who are capable of immediately assuming positions as navigators, gunnery officers, and hydrographers.

Grechko Naval Academy

The Grechko Naval Academy is the Soviet navy's only senior service school. Its faculty included many more admirals than did the Frunze. The students are lieutenant commanders, commanders, and some captains, with ages 30-35 years. All naval officers (including naval aviation) holding positions above the regiment (wing) level are graduates of this school. Some Soviet air force officers are assigned to the faculty, but no air force officers are permitted in the student body. (This policy' of strict separatism in education leads one to wonder if cooperation among the Soviet armed services is as good as it could be.)

The curriculum is two to three years in length and consists of political training in Marxism-Leninism, foreign languages, naval history, naval tactics, force structure, ship construction, and fleet operations. As in other Soviet military schools, there is strong emphasis on automation, the study of cybernetics, and narrow technical research involving operations analysis. Oddly enough, there appears to be no attempt to use modeling or prediction in simulation exercises at the Grechko Academy, a paradox that has been pointed out by John Erickson. 9 It is a paradox because the students participate in three or four large tabletop exercises per year. These extensive battle simulations and war games are used to heighten student interest, teach specific tactical "lessons," and acquaint each of the students with the various roles of the air force commander, submarine commander, surface forces commander, etc.

Whereas the Frunze Naval School had been relatively austere, the Grechko Academy was handsomely appointed and well equipped. The facilities included a submarine torpedo laboratory with analogue and digital computer simulation. A second laboratory housed a low-speed, 16 square-foot hydrodynamic water tunnel used to investigate and demonstrate the effect of wave action on mines and to study the firing, control, and stability properties of submarine torpedoes.

Students participate in a common core program and then specialize to conduct research and write scientific papers. The majority of instruction appeared to be by lecture and laboratory; there was no evidence of any political-military education or seminar facilities. The emphasis on Marxism-Leninism was markedly less than at the Frunze. Military education at the Grechko Academy was remarkably nonideological but was aimed instead at tactical fleet operations and technical weapon capabilities. We were to find much the same emphasis at the armored school.

 

Malinovskiy
Tank Academy

 

The Malinovskiy Tank Academy was founded in 1932 as the Stalin Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army. Today it has the mission of training Soviet and Warsaw Pact commanders, staff officers, and engineers for armored and mechanized units. The best-qualified graduates are also selected for the centralized operations division of the General Staff. Students enter as captains and majors (with some lieutenant colonels), indicating it is about on an intermediate level with the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The program of instruction is three years for commanders and staff officers and four years for engineers.

The Commandant, Marshal O. A. Losik ("Hero of the Soviet Union"), and more than fifty percent of the faculty were veterans of combat in the Great Patriotic War. Of the remaining faculty, all combined academic degrees with troop experience, except for a few recent graduates who had been permitted to join the faculty in the capacity of technical specialists. All faculty and students were members of the Communist Party.

Instruction at the Tank Academy includes political training (12 percent), cultural visits, military theory, operations research engineering, tactics, and field exercises. The facility has over 300 classrooms, laboratories, and lecture halls (again no seminar rooms), but 60-70 percent of the time was allegedly devoted to practical studies outside the classroom. Some of this time is allotted to detailed study of full-scale, operating models of Soviet armored equipment, including a T62 tank and a BMP-l armored fighting vehicle. Further exemplifying this hands-on training, the students are taken on numerous field trips to view military exercises and learn to drive tanks, fire guns, and repair vehicles. Although this type of technical training is expensive in terms of student time, it is justified under the philosophy that the officer must know the duties of all those below him. More than at any other school, the veneration of World War II was evident at the Tank Academy. Three long halls contain graphic descriptions of historical battles and tank development. Movies taken in 1943-45 by Russian combat photographers are used extensively as teaching devices in battle simulations ranging from maneuver exercises to very realistic command, control, and communication jamming problems. 10

Soviet military thought is dominated by the strategy and tactics of armored warfare. Soviet officers at the Tank Academy outlined their offensive battle doctrine, which is further spelled out in Sidorenko's The Offensive. 11 It included the following elements: the land battle is the deciding factor in warfare; joint combined arms will win the land battle; tanks play an important-but not an exclusive-role; armored troops can achieve victory only with the assistance of tactical aviation; and, finally, the Israeli 1973 lessons are limited to those of a "local war" and not generally applicable to Europe. (We know from other sources, however, that the Soviets have thoroughly examined the October War, and its lessons have become part of an ongoing doctrinal debate on the role of antitank weapons.)

Voroshilov General Staff Academy
Frunze Academy
Malinovskiy Armored Troops Academy
Kalinin Artillery Academy
Dzerzhinskiy Rocket Forces Academy
Gargarin Air Academy
Zhukovskiy Military Air Engineering Academy
Govorov Air Defense Engineering-Radio­
    Technical Academy
Zhukov Air Defense Command Academy
Grechko Naval Academy.
Kuybyshev Engineering Academy
Budenniy Signals Academy
Timoshenko Chemical Defense Academy
Lenin Political-Military Academy
Makarov Rear Services and Transportation Academy 
Kirov Medical Academy
Military Academy of Air Defense of Ground Troops
Military Research Institutes (7)

Total     24

Sources: Compiled from information provided by Harriet Fast Scott, National Defense University, 22 March 1977, and Air Force Soviet Awareness group.

Table III. Soviet military academies and institutes

Comparisons with U.S.
Military Education

While the information collected on this brief excursion of Soviet military schools is limited, it can be compared with other information and certain tentative conclusions drawn. First, Soviet military education is more extensive than that in the United States or Western Europe, and it has grown significantly since World War II. (See Table IV.) In 1939 there were approximately 109 undergraduate, officer commissioning schools, and 14 "academies." By 1975 the number of undergraduate schools had burgeoned to 151, and the number of academies increased to 17. In addition to these large numbers, some Soviet civil universities give military training similar to ROTC and graduate commissioned officers, primarily in the support and logistics specialties.

Table IV. Growth in Soviet officer education

 

1939

1975

Officer-commissioning,
middle and higher schools
109 151
Academies 14 17
Military institutes
     Totals
? 7

Source: Marshal A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 1974, p. 207 and Tables 1-3.

Second, Soviet military education institutions are not only numerous but they also command an impressive portion of the total Russian investment in education. (See Table V.) Despite some uncertainties in the numbers, military officer-training schools constitute more than fifteen percent of the undergraduate institutions and thirty percent of the postgraduate universities. To a degree, these numbers must be adjusted, however, because military schools are not as large as civilian schools. The average number of civilian students per institution is apparently about 2850, whereas the military schools have traditionally had only 1000 to 1100.12 In any case, it is apparent that the proportion of Soviet resources devoted to military education is impressive.

Third, Soviet military courses of instruction are two to three times longer than their U.S. counterparts. No U.S. professional military school is longer than one year, while Soviet schools appear to average two to three years and some run to four years. U.S. military services educate officers at various military-technical schools like the Air Force Institute of Technology residence course, but the numbers of these programs are extremely small. The Soviets apparently do not believe in sending large numbers of military officers to civilian schools for graduate education, yet this has been one of the most beneficial U.S. programs. 13

Fourth, comparisons of the role of faculties provide some contrasts. Soviet faculty members appear to be much older and of much higher rank than their U.S. counterparts. Commandants of "academies" are, by Soviet law, rank equivalent to military district commanders. Also by law, academy heads of departments must be general officers. Between 250 and 350 generals and admirals are assigned as commandants and faculty members in military schools. There are very few civilians and almost no women on military faculties, and those so employed are utilized in specialist capacities like teaching foreign languages.

On the subject of quality, there are some indications that Soviet military faculty officers have more influence in their services than do U.S. faculties. Colonel General N. A. Lomov, editor of Scientific Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, had been a professor at the General Staff Academy. Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, author of The Offensive, is a Doctor of Military Science and a faculty member of the Frunze Military Academy. These are just two examples, but they suffice to make the point: Soviet military faculties and educational institutions appear to be key ingredients in developing and explaining Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and tactics.14

There are several partial explanations for this difference. It is true that the compartmentalized nature of the Soviet system inhibits civilians from writing on military matters. It is also accurate to say that the U.S. body of strategic and military thought is more diffused among physical and social scientists, strategic analysts, congressional staff members, industrial researchers, public interest advocates, and executive policy-makers. These justifications suffice to explain why most U.S. strategic conceptual innovations are the product of civilians rather than of military officers. They do not demonstrate why U.S. military school faculties do not produce more high-quality studies of strategy and tactics.

Fifth, military history is the thread that ties the educational curricula together. Each school seems to emphasize a slightly different period in Russian history, depending on the perceived role of the service or branch at that time. For the Russian navy, the closest historical analogue appears to be the late Czarist period; for the armored forces, it is clearly from the battle of Kursk in 1943 to the battle for Berlin. Military history reinforces the role of strategic and tactical doctrine, and teaching these three subjects is high among the primary objectives of the schools.

The overall broader purposes of Soviet military officer education appear to be: to give the officer a broad background in Russian national history and contemporary culture; to prepare him ideologically for long-term political and military competition with the West; to specialize him in military skills for duty in his school's branch; to prepare him to cope with increasingly complex science and technology and "the revolution in military affairs;" to identify the most promising officers for promotion and duty in the General Staff; and to further socialize the officer into the centralized, command directed military profession. To accomplish these objectives, entrance and graduation examinations are required in the subjects of Marxism-Leninism, military art, strategy, and military doctrine. Successful completion of one of the academies is a mark of distinction and status, prominently displayed in the form of a badge worn on the officer's tunic.

THE quality of Soviet officer education is most difficult of all to compare, To a Western observer, the education appears to be technically specialized, tactically oriented, and steeped in traditional military history, yet it most probably meets what the Soviets perceive as their requirements,

The content of the training appears to foster control more than initiative, centralized authority more than independent action, and a narrow technical approach rather than systems integration. To the degree that this is a correct assessment, Soviet military education would appear to mirror Soviet civil education. In the final analysis, the question is whether training for control is more important than education for initiative. While Western liberal education has overwhelmingly been devoted to the latter, Soviet civil and military education is a unique product of Russian history and an authoritarian regime and is well-suited to a growing scientific technological power with a war-fighting doctrine.

Council on Foreign Relations
New York, New York

Notes

1. A Soviet colonel-general wears three stars and is equivalent to a U.S. lieutenant general, a Soviet lieutenant-general wears two stars, and a major-general wears one.

2. This common desire for a multiplicity of communication channels and increased military exchanges was further exemplified by the in vitiation to U.S. Brigadier General John C. Bard to lecture at the Institute of Military History in Moscow. His lecture was on the subject of U.S. Army amphibious assault tactics in the Philippines in World War II. The lecture took place in Moscow on 26 September 1977 and was followed by a similar lecture in Leningrad two days later. A reciprocal visit by Major-General Ivan Efimovich Krupchenko, Head of Chair of the History and Art of Wars, Military Academy of Armored Troops, was conducted in November 1977. General Krupchenko lectured at the Army War College and the Army Command and General Staff College. For details see the Washington Post, 27 October 1977, p. 18.

3. For a detailed, though somewhat dated, description of the Russian educational system, see Alexander G. Korol, Soviet Education for Science and Technology (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1957).

4. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1976), p. 320. Smith's graphic and moving report of living in Moscow with his family for three years is an in. dispensable insight into the Russian character, its political institutions, and social system.

5. Another excellent, though little known, study of the inner dynamics of the Soviet system is William E. Odom, The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973). Odom, an Army colonel now on the staff of the National Security Council, applied the methods of organization theory and political analysis to the study of DOSAAF and its predecessor organizations in the 1920s and 1930s.

6. For an in-depth description of these schools for air force officers, see Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Murray, Jr., "The Education and Training of Soviet Air Force Officers," Strategic Review, Spring 1977, pp. 83-88.

7. William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts within the Soviet Forces," in The Future of Soviet Military Power edited by Lawrence L. Whetten (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), p. 86.

8. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, in eleven parts, January-November 1974. See also Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 2d ed., (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1978).

9. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Operational Research: Objectives and Methods," Strategic Review, Spring 1977, p. 68.

10. There are many verifications of the Soviet emphasis on the lessons of World War II. One of the most cogent is that of General of the Army I. Paviovsky, Deputy Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of the Land Forces. "Thirty years have elapsed since the final battles of the Second World War, in the course of which the Soviet Land Forces enriched themselves with experience in the theory and practice of battles and operations. . . . In spite of the qualitative post war changes in weaponry and in the methods of their use, this rich experience has not lost its significance and is now an important source of knowledge for training and educating the troops. Scientifically generalized, this experience has found its expression in all manuals of the Soviet Armed Forces." Cited by Arthur J. Alexander, Armored Development in the Soviet Union and the United States, The Rand Corporation, R.1860.NA, September 1976, p. 10.

11. Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (Moscow, 1970); translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1974.

12. William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," Problems of Communism, September-October 1976, p. 38.

13. For a persuasive argument in favor of civilian graduate education, see Sam C. Sarkesian and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers," in American Defense Policy, fourth edition, edited by John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 567-72.

14. Although the last two decades have seen a flourishing of Soviet writings on strategy, tactics, and weapon development, it has not always been so. During the life of Stalin, his personal dominance of military affairs inhibited the discussion and development of strategic studies. For instance, in 1935 a series of lectures on strategy was prepared at the Frunze Military Academy, but they were never given. Paradoxically, after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet military was still unsure of its role. During the four years between Stalin's death and Khrushchev's denouncement speech, strategic studies and military history were both severely curtailed. For an excellent discussion of this ebb and flow, see Harriet Fast Scott's edition of Soviet Military Strategy by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy (New York: Crane Russak, 1975), pp. xviii ff.


Contributor

Colonel Richard G. Head (B.S., U.S. Air Force Academy; M.P.A., Ph.D., Syracuse University) is Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He wrote this article while a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Colonel Head has served eleven years in fighter aircraft, including command of an F-4E air superiority squadron in the Pacific and 325 combat missions. His previous publications include American Defense Policy, 3d ed. (co-edited with Colonel Ervin J. Rokke), Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations (with Lt. Colonel Robert C. McFarlane and Colonel Frisco W. Short), forthcoming, and "Technology and the Military Balance," Foreign Affairs, April 1978. Colonel Head is a 1977 graduate of the National War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.



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